[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"mm-article:scaglioni-sanzioni-trasporto:en:live":3},{"slug":4,"date":5,"theme":6,"featured":7,"title":8,"abstract":9,"cover":10,"coverAlt":11,"infographic":12,"infographicAlt":13,"infographicLarge":14,"infographicCount":15,"blocks":16,"metaDescription":9,"infographicFull":40,"infographics":41,"seo":44,"language":46,"unpublished":7,"related":47},"scaglioni-sanzioni-trasporto","2026-07-22","economia-finanza-tariffe",false,"The price of delay: time brackets as a lever to improve fine collection in local public transport","In local public transport, a tiered penalty structure proves to be an effective incentive for prompt payment. This analysis is based on a sample of public transport operators built from data collected by Holacheck during fare inspection activities in 2025. The results show that more than 70% of payments are made within the first five days, while voluntary payments after sixty days are virtually non-existent. A comparison across operators highlights that an early increase in the amount of the fine encourages recipients to pay sooner, reducing procrastination and unpaid fines. More than the amount of the fine itself, it is the design of the penalty tiers that determines the effectiveness of the collection system.","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F141684f9-a9be-4078-b331-743b3f1a9eaf?width=800&format=webp","Mobility Metrics cover on fine payment brackets: average cost €60 within 5 days, €79 up to 60 days and €211 thereafter; 71% of payments are made within 5 days","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F2f110278-7c23-4442-9dd1-68b30b596c8c?width=500&format=webp","Infographic comparing two fine bracket schemes: at €60\u002F€79\u002F€211, 71% pay within 5 days; with a flat €70 up to 60 days, only 41% do","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F2f110278-7c23-4442-9dd1-68b30b596c8c?width=1000&format=webp",1,[17,20,22,24,26,28,30,32,36,38],{"type":18,"html":19},"paragraph","\u003Cp>In local public transport, the penalty for travelling without a valid ticket does not have a fixed cost: its amount increases over time. During the first few days, the fine is reduced; within sixty days, it rises to the standard amount; beyond that threshold, additional surcharges apply, potentially tripling the amount due. This tiered structure is well known, yet its actual impact on payment behaviour is rarely measured.\u003C\u002Fp>\n",{"type":18,"html":21},"\u003Cp>The sample covers three payment windows:\u003C\u002Fp>\n",{"type":18,"html":23},"\u003Col>\n\u003Cli>Within 5 days\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Fol>\n",{"type":18,"html":25},"\u003Col start=\"2\">\n\u003Cli>Between 6 and 60 days\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Fol>\n",{"type":18,"html":27},"\u003Col start=\"3\">\n\u003Cli>After 60 days\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Fol>\n",{"type":18,"html":29},"\u003Cp>The average fine increases from approximately €60 in the first payment window to €79 in the second, and €211 in the third, reaching more than three and a half times the initial amount. Payment behaviour follows the opposite pattern: on average, 71% of payments are made within the first five days, 26% between the sixth and sixtieth day, and only 3% after that period. Across approximately one quarter of the operators in the sample, no voluntary payments are recorded once the sixty-day threshold has passed. As the cost increases, the share of payments falls sharply: those who intend to pay generally do so immediately, while those who postpone payment, in the vast majority of cases, never pay at all.\u003C\u002Fp>\n",{"type":18,"html":31},"\u003Cp>That this behaviour is driven by the price differential—rather than simply by the diligence of those receiving the fine—is suggested by an internal comparison within the sample. Some operators do not increase the amount after the first five days, keeping the same fine throughout the entire sixty-day period. In these cases, payment behaviour is markedly different: 41% of payments are made within the first five days, compared with 54% during the following fifty-five days. The absence of an early price increase therefore appears to reduce the incentive for prompt payment. Without a financial advantage to paying early, payments are spread much more evenly over time, confirming that it is the presence of the first pricing &quot;step&quot; that concentrates payments in the initial days.\u003C\u002Fp>\n",{"type":33,"level":34,"text":35},"heading",2,"Conclusion",{"type":18,"html":37},"\u003Cp>The conclusion may seem paradoxical: the surcharge works precisely because almost no one ends up paying it. Its value lies not in the additional revenue—which is marginal by definition—but in the incentive it creates. By making delay economically irrational, it concentrates payments in the period when collection is simplest and least costly, before reminders, enforcement orders, and legal recovery procedures become necessary. In other words, a significantly higher cost for late payment acts as an effective deterrent against both procrastination and non-payment.\u003C\u002Fp>\n",{"type":18,"html":39},"\u003Cp>For public transport operators, this leads to a clear operational implication: the key lever is not the base amount of the fine, but the design of the penalty tiers. An early and clearly noticeable increase, communicated effectively on the notice and supported by immediate payment channels, shifts the majority of payments into the first few days, when receivables are both more valuable and less expensive to collect. Beyond sixty days, the data leave little room for doubt: the opportunity for voluntary payment has effectively disappeared.\u003C\u002Fp>\n","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F2f110278-7c23-4442-9dd1-68b30b596c8c",[42],{"thumb":43,"large":14,"full":40,"alt":13},"\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F2f110278-7c23-4442-9dd1-68b30b596c8c?width=200&format=webp",{"title":45,"description":45,"image":45,"noindex":7},null,"en",[48,59,69],{"slug":49,"date":50,"theme":6,"featured":7,"title":51,"abstract":52,"cover":53,"coverAlt":54,"infographic":55,"infographicAlt":56,"infographicLarge":57,"infographicCount":58},"caro-diesel-e-extragettito-iva-tpl","2026-10-26","Diesel price surges and additional VAT revenues for the state: the proposal for a fuel price stabilization fund for public transport","Diesel prices, now driven by geopolitical factors rather than crude oil prices, are generating substantial additional VAT revenues for the state, making temporary subsidies to public transport operators inadequate and unsustainable. The sector is not facing a temporary shock, but a “new normal” that calls for structural measures based on the redistribution of additional VAT revenues.","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F3bd7981b-7855-40ec-afc4-4e091085cf40?width=800&format=webp","Mobility Metrics cover on diesel prices: fuel can showing an average self-service price of €2.281\u002Fl, of which €0.984\u002Fl is VAT and excise, and a crack spread above $100 a barrel","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F5b32084f-2809-48dd-909e-3a0a65f08378?width=500&format=webp","Infographic on diesel prices: €2.281\u002Fl (€0.984 VAT and excise), crack spread up from $15–25 to over $100 a barrel, and the industrial price rising faster than Brent in 2026","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F5b32084f-2809-48dd-909e-3a0a65f08378?width=1000&format=webp",3,{"slug":60,"date":61,"theme":6,"featured":7,"title":62,"abstract":63,"cover":64,"coverAlt":65,"infographic":66,"infographicAlt":67,"infographicLarge":68,"infographicCount":15},"evasione-tariffaria-tpl-lombardia","2026-10-13","Fare evasion in local public transport in Lombardy: a loss of €137 million a year","The analysis, based on data collected by Holacheck, reveals the economic impact of fare evasion in Lombardy: over 14% of passengers do not pay for a ticket, generating an estimated economic loss of €137.5 million per year in lost revenue and uncollected fines. The phenomenon is concentrated mainly among young people: over 53% of fined passengers are under 26. Timely collection proves decisive: only 45.4% of fines are collected, while more than half remain unpaid, highlighting weaknesses in the system for recovering the sums owed.","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F1f48f731-4248-44fd-b58c-a5689fcc0ea5?width=800&format=webp","Mobility Metrics cover on fare evasion in Lombardy: actual rate of 14.2% and an estimated €137.5 million annual shortfall, shown with a Milan tram and the Duomo","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fd4912201-5dc0-4945-8189-25245c5f80dc?width=500&format=webp","Infographic on fare evasion in Lombardy: 14.2% rate and a €137.5 million annual loss; 53% of those fined are under 26 and only 45% of fines are collected","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fd4912201-5dc0-4945-8189-25245c5f80dc?width=1000&format=webp",{"slug":70,"date":71,"theme":6,"featured":7,"title":72,"abstract":73,"cover":74,"coverAlt":75,"infographic":76,"infographicAlt":77,"infographicLarge":78,"infographicCount":15},"recidivi-nel-trasporto-pubblico-locale","2026-08-05","Repeat offenders in local public transport: when fines accumulate but remain uncollected","The analysis of repeat offenders highlights one of the main critical issues in combating fare evasion: issuing a fine alone guarantees neither payment nor an effective deterrent effect. The sample examined is based on data collected by Holacheck as part of ticket inspection activities. Despite being correctly identified, these individuals continue to accumulate citations without changing their behavior. The data demonstrates that the effectiveness of inspections depends primarily on the ability of transit companies to turn issued fines into actual collected receivables.","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F94b4539a-43df-4774-8ae7-65711dcc5363?width=800&format=webp","Mobility Metrics cover on repeat fare evaders: ID cards with made-up names and caricatures, such as \"Struzzo Corridore\" with 268 fines, nearly all unpaid","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fb7745df5-f853-4ac7-9dd9-d16e39160033?width=500&format=webp","Infographic on the six worst repeat offenders, under made-up names: between 268 and 121 fines each with virtually none paid, showing that fines alone do not deter","\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fb7745df5-f853-4ac7-9dd9-d16e39160033?width=1000&format=webp"]