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Diesel price surges and additional VAT revenues for the state:the proposal for a fuel price stabilization fund for public transport

Diesel prices, now driven by geopolitical factors rather than crude oil prices, are generating substantial additional VAT revenues for the state, making temporary subsidies to public transport operators inadequate and unsustainable. The sector is not facing a temporary shock, but a “new normal” that calls for structural measures based on the redistribution of additional VAT revenues.

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The Broken Paradigm: Brent vs. Diesel

Historically, there has been a strong positive correlation between the Brent spot price (the global benchmark for crude oil) and the retail price of diesel, with a correlation coefficient often close to 0.89 on a scale from 0 to 1. Brent represents the cost of the essential raw material.

However, the data available for 2026 reveal a significant divergence, measured in financial markets by the diesel crack spread, i.e. the refining margin (the difference between the cost of a barrel of crude oil and the value of refined diesel).

Under normal conditions, this margin fluctuates between $15 and $25 per barrel. However, in August 2026, the crack spread broke all historical records, exceeding $100 per barrel. This means that geopolitical conflicts are disrupting industrial facilities, driving the price of the finished product sharply higher even when crude oil prices fall.

In 2026 the industrial price of diesel moved beyond Brent alone
Indexed trend, January 2026 = 100
In 2026 the industrial price of diesel moved beyond Brent alone
Diesel – industrial componentBrent
Jan100100
Feb104108
Mar153156
Apr181177
May165162
Jun143128
Jul146126
Aug172137
Sep188175
The divergence between June and August
Shows the growing weight of refining and product availability.
IEA data for Brent and MASE/Confetra for diesel

Today’s problem is not a lack of crude oil to extract, but a shortage of operational refineries capable of processing it into diesel, compounded by transportation and logistical bottlenecks.

The Conflict Map Behind Artificially High Diesel Prices

Here is a map of the conflicts and market dynamics artificially driving up diesel prices:

1

The Russia–Ukraine Front: The Collapse of Russian Refining Capacity

  • Drone warfare: From spring through the summer of 2026, Ukraine intensified targeted drone strikes against Russian refining infrastructure. At their peak, these attacks are estimated to have disrupted or taken offline more than 40% of Russia’s operational refining capacity.
  • Export restrictions: To protect its domestic market, which is vital to ongoing military operations and the agricultural season, Russia was forced to impose drastic diesel export bans, effectively withdrawing from the seaborne market in which it had historically ranked among the world’s top three suppliers.

2

Escalation in the Middle East (Persian Gulf)

  • Direct attacks on refineries: The widening conflict in the Middle East, involving actors such as Iran and Houthi militias, has shifted the focus to major refining hubs. Key facilities in Saudi Arabia (including Jazan and Ras Tanura), Bahrain (Bapco) and the United Arab Emirates sustained damage or underwent prolonged precautionary shutdowns during 2026, removing millions of barrels of refined products per day from the market.
  • Refined product bottleneck: While crude oil exports from the Middle East have managed to remain at relatively acceptable levels, exports of refined products (such as diesel and jet fuel) have plummeted, leaving Europe in particular facing a severe supply crisis.

3

The Red Sea and Strait Shipping Crisis

  • Shipping times and freight costs: Ongoing threats to maritime traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, alongside tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, are forcing many tankers carrying diesel supplies that have remained available despite refinery shutdowns in Asia and the Middle East to reroute around Africa. This extends delivery times by several weeks, creating localized supply shortages at European ports, keeping pump prices high and increasing insurance costs.

4

“Friendly Fire”: Refinery Closures in the West

  • While the war is destroying refineries in the East, the West (North America and Europe) is grappling with the gradual, planned closure of ageing facilities, driven by the energy transition and historically low profit margins. Without sufficient domestic spare capacity, Europe is now highly exposed to external shocks affecting refined products.
  • Over the past decade, Europe has deliberately reduced its domestic refining capacity for environmental reasons and due to weak profitability. There are no “idle” facilities ready to be restarted to offset international supply shortages.

Why Will This Anomaly Persist?

The key difference compared with past oil shocks — when an increase in OPEC production was often enough to bring prices down — lies in the technical and logistical challenges of repairs.

Restoring production at an oil well can be a relatively quick process, but rebuilding a refinery’s cracking and secondary processing units after missile strikes requires at least 6–8 months in peacetime. In Russia’s case, Western sanctions also restrict access to critical spare parts, forcing operators to resort to improvised repairs that fail to restore the facility to its original efficiency.

Until global refining capacity recovers to levels sufficient to meet normal demand, diesel prices will remain structurally high, decoupled from the usual fluctuations in Brent crude oil prices.

In 2026, Taxation Has Mitigated the Shock, but Not Eliminated It

The price at the pump can be broken down into three components: the industrial component, excise duties and VAT. In 2026, the Government intervened several times to adjust excise duties, with the aim of limiting the pass-through of the shock to the final price. This has highlighted an important phenomenon: while the industrial component has risen sharply, taxation has been used as a buffer.

The Windfall Tax Revenue: The State as a Beneficiary

Automotive diesel in Italy: price breakdown in 2026
€ per litre; VAT at 22%, excise derived by difference
Automotive diesel in Italy: price breakdown in 2026
Industrial componentExcise dutyVATTotale
Jan0.690.680.31.67 €
Feb0.720.670.311.70 €
Mar1.060.570.361.99 €
Apr1.250.470.382.10 €
May1.140.510.362.01 €
Jun0.990.610.351.95 €
Jul1.010.650.372.03 €
Aug1.190.530.382.10 €
21 Sep1.30.570.412.28 €
Source: MASE, data reported by Confetra. January–August: monthly averages; 21 September: weekly observation

Between January and 21 September, the final price rose from approximately €1.665 to €2.281 per litre, an increase of around 37%. Over the same period, the industrial component rose from €0.692 to €1.297 per litre, almost doubling. The difference between these two changes shows that fiscal measures absorbed part of the shock, but cannot eliminate the pressure stemming from the refined products market.

This is where VAT comes into play. At a constant tax rate, a higher taxable base generates a greater amount of VAT embedded in the price. In 2025, the average amount was approximately €0.298 per litre; by August 2026, it had risen to approximately €0.379, reaching €0.411 in the 21 September observation. This figure is significant, but must be interpreted correctly: it represents gross VAT embedded in the sale price, not an automatic measure of the state’s net additional tax revenue. Estimating actual tax revenue requires data from the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), as deductions, sales volumes, the composition of sales channels and other taxable bases all play a role.

VAT included in the price of diesel
Growth of the per-litre component
VAT included in the price of diesel
Valore
20250.298 €
Aug 20260.379 €
Sep 20260.411 €
Basco&T elaboration on MASE/Confetra data

Actual Consumption: How Many Litres of Diesel Are Sold in Italy?

Market volumes nevertheless help illustrate the scale of the issue. In 2025, automotive diesel consumption in Italy amounted to approximately 23.3 million tonnes, equivalent to around 27.9 billion litres, assuming a density of 0.835 kg per litre.

Calculating the Additional VAT Revenue

In purely arithmetic terms, every additional €0.10 of VAT embedded per litre corresponds to approximately €2.8 billion annually, assuming volumes remain unchanged. This is not an estimate of net tax revenue, but rather an illustration of how quickly the tax base expands when fuel prices rise.

Pump price and taxes on diesel
€ per litre
Pump price and taxes on diesel
Pump priceTotal taxesFixed excise dutyVAT share 22%
20201.37 €0.87 €0.62 €0.2 €
20221.88 €0.79 €0.37 €0.31 €
20241.75 €0.96 €0.62 €0.3 €
20262.15 €1.02 €0.62 €0.41 €
What happened
  1. 2020consumption collapses with Covid. The hard core of taxes keeps the price from falling below €1.30.
  2. 2022the Draghi government temporarily cuts excise duties by 25 cents (a one-off measure).
  3. 2024the excise discount ends and the structural regime returns.
  4. 2026geopolitical crisis in refined products; the government collects record VAT revenue.

Now let us apply the difference in VAT revenue calculated in the previous table to the volume of litres sold.

For a conservative estimate, we will use an annual baseline of <strong27 billion litres</strong.

Scenario A

Comparison with the Pre-Crisis Period (2020)

  • Average VAT per litre in 2020: €0.24/litre
  • Average VAT per litre in 2026 (at a price of €2.14/litre): €0.39/litre
  • Difference (additional VAT per litre): €0.15/litre

27.000.000.000 litri × 0,15 € = 4.050.000.000 €

Compared with 2020, the Italian state is collecting over €4 billion more per year in VAT on diesel alone.

Scenario B

Comparison with the Most Recent “Normal” Year (2024)

  • Average VAT per litre in 2024: €0.32/litre
  • Average VAT per litre in 2026: €0.39/litre
  • Difference (additional VAT per litre): €0.07/litre

27.000.000.000 litri × 0,07 € = 1.890.000.000 €

The geopolitical price surge over the past two years alone is generating nearly €2 billion in additional annual revenue for public coffers, at “zero cost” to the state.

For Public Transport, the Problem Is the Mismatch Between Costs and Revenues

For a company operating in a competitive market, at least in theory, rising costs can be passed on to customers through higher prices. In Local Public Transport (LPT), this mechanism is much slower and often incomplete. Fares, service contracts, payments and administrative procedures do not adjust in real time. As a result, the shock immediately affects costs, while recovering those costs through revenues or compensation may take months.

The year 2026 provides a concrete example. The Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (MIT) introduced a tax credit for freight and passenger transport operators, covering up to 70% of the additional diesel expenditure incurred between March and August compared with February. The measure is significant, but it remains limited to a specific time window and a capped budget. The MIT itself has announced that, because applications exceeded the allocated funding, the amounts must be adjusted proportionally.

The limitation is therefore not merely quantitative. Above all, it is a question of predictability. To prepare a budget, an Economic and Financial Plan (PEF) or an industrial plan, an operator needs to know how a potential new shock will be addressed and within what timeframe. An extraordinary tax credit introduced after costs have risen may help ease liquidity pressures, but it cannot replace an ex ante rule. If volatility in refined product markets is likely to recur, the response should become part of the sector’s standard framework.

From an Extraordinary Subsidy to an Automatic Stabilisation Mechanism

The Proposal for a Fuel Price Stabilisation Fund for Public Transport

A solution better suited to the nature of the problem would be a Fuel Price Stabilisation Fund for Public Transport, triggered by observable parameters rather than discretionary decisions made after a shock has occurred. The most appropriate benchmark would not be Brent crude, but the national industrial diesel price published by MASE, as it is the variable most closely aligned with the costs actually incurred by operators and reflects both raw material costs and pressures on refining and logistics.

The mechanism could be triggered when the quarterly average industrial price exceeds a predefined threshold, for example by around 10–15%. Above this threshold, a share of the increase would be reimbursed based on the litres actually consumed in the provision of services subject to public service obligations. Compensation should not be total: a deductible threshold and a reimbursement rate below 100% would preserve incentives for efficiency and limit the burden on public finances.

COMPENSATION FORMULA

Compensation = Eligible litres × Price increase above the threshold × Reimbursement rate

The fund should also operate on the basis of the residual net cost, automatically deducting any excise duty refunds, tax credits or other forms of compensation relating to the same fuel. This would prevent overcompensation and ensure that the system complies with the principle of proportionality. Finally, an automatic exit clause, triggered when prices fall below the threshold for several consecutive quarters, would prevent an emergency measure from becoming a permanent transfer.

01020304
Activation Threshold Quarterly average MASE industrial diesel price exceeds a predefined threshold (e.g. 10–15%).Partial Compensation A share of the price increase above the threshold is reimbursed on actual fuel consumption for services subject to public service obligations, with a deductible and a reimbursement rate below 100%.Residual Net Cost Excise duty refunds, tax credits and other compensation relating to the same fuel are deducted.Automatic Exit If prices remain below the threshold for several consecutive quarters, the measure is automatically discontinued.

The main advantage of such a model would not simply be the amount of financial support, but the certainty of the rules. Operators and contracting authorities could incorporate a predefined formula into the Economic and Financial Plan (PEF), distinguishing between ordinary risk, which remains the responsibility of the company, and exceptional shocks, which are partially shared when they exceed objective thresholds.

The fund would therefore operate as a form of public insurance against extreme energy price shocks, rather than as a blanket guarantee on diesel prices.

Additional Tax Revenue Could Fund It, but Only Under a Prudent Rule

The proposal to allocate a share of the additional tax revenue generated by high fuel prices is sustainable only if framed precisely. It would be incorrect to speak of “refunding VAT paid by the LPT sector”: VAT on purchases is generally deductible for businesses, and the additional gross VAT collected at the pump does not equate to net tax revenue. A more robust approach would be to allocate a share of the additional VAT revenue on energy products, as certified by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) against a benchmark, to the fund, subject to an annual cap and a transparent formula.

This approach also has the advantage of not requiring an entirely new principle. Under the decree of 8 May 2026, adopted in response to rising oil prices, €191.2 million in additional VAT revenue was used to offset the loss of revenue resulting from the reduction in excise duties. This is a significant precedent, demonstrating that the existing legal framework has already recognised the link between additional VAT revenue and the partial mitigation of an energy price shock.

The difference compared with an emergency measure would be to make this approach automatic and sector-specific. When certified tax revenue increases as a result of the shock and the industrial price exceeds the threshold, a share of the resources would be allocated to the fund. If the additional revenue proved insufficient, compensation would be reduced according to a formula established in advance, without creating unlimited spending commitments. This would keep the mechanism fiscally manageable while making it far more predictable than one-off interventions.

Protecting the Service, Not Incentivising Continued Reliance on Diesel

Finally, one point should not be overlooked. Compensating for high diesel prices must not become a permanent incentive to maintain fleets that are more heavily reliant on fossil fuels. The mechanism should therefore be accompanied by a transition component: a limited share of the resources could be allocated to measures that structurally reduce diesel consumption, from operational efficiency to fleet renewal and the development of alternative charging or refuelling infrastructure.

The rationale is simple. In the short term, the economic continuity of an essential public service must be protected; in the medium term, its exposure to the very same factors that make such protection necessary must be reduced. These two policies are not contradictory. On the contrary, they become mutually consistent when compensation is temporary, measurable and linked to a pathway for reducing energy-related risk.

Conclusion

The events of 2026 have made it clear that assessing diesel costs solely through the price of Brent crude can lead to an underestimation of risk. Crude oil remains the starting point of the supply chain, but the price paid by fleets also depends on refining capacity, the availability of middle distillates, trade routes and the tax system. When these factors move in the same direction, pressure on Local Public Transport (LPT) can build much faster than contracts and service payments can be adjusted.

The issue, therefore, is not simply to increase financial support, but to change its underlying framework. A one-off measure intervenes after the shock has already affected companies’ balance sheets; an automatic stabilisation mechanism defines in advance the activation conditions, calculation basis, compensation limits and funding sources. The prudent use of a share of additional tax revenue could help finance the mechanism, particularly given the existence of a legal precedent that already points in this direction.

Ultimately, the proposal does not aim to offset every increase in fuel prices. Its purpose is to prevent a regulated public service from having to absorb the full impact of an exceptional geopolitical shock that it cannot promptly pass on through its revenues. This is the difference between an emergency subsidy and a genuine risk management policy.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE: The January–August 2026 diesel price data are monthly averages; the observation for 21 September is a weekly figure. Estimates of VAT embedded in the price are arithmetic calculations based on the retail price and do not constitute an estimate of the state’s net VAT revenue.

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